Post-financial crisis recoveries tend to be slow and be accompanied by slowdowns in TFP. For monetary policy analysis in this situation, we develop a model in which an adverse financial shock can induce a slow recovery through an endogenous TFP mechanism. In the face of the financial shocks, a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule features a strong response to output, and the welfare gain from output stabilization is much larger than when TFP is exogenous. Compared with the welfare-maximizing rule, inflation stabilization rules induce a sizable welfare loss, while nominal GDP stabilization rules perform well, although they cause high interest-rate volatility. (JEL E52, O33) * Ikeda: Bank of England (secondment from the Bank of Japan), Threadneedle St, London EC2R 8AH (e-mail: Daisuke.Ikeda@bankofengland.co.uk); Kurozumi: Bank of Japan, 2-1-1 Nihonbashi-Hongokucho,
Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent global …nancial crisis, many economies have been faced with slow recoveries from post-crisis recessions. GDP in the U.S. has not recovered to its precrisis growth trend, and GDP in the Euro area has not even returned to its pre-crisis level.
As indicated by recent studies, such as Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) , …nancial crises tend to be followed by slow recoveries in which GDP scarcely returns to its pre-crisis growth trend and involves a considerable economic loss. Indeed, since the …nancial crisis in the 1990s, Japan's GDP has never recovered to its pre-crisis growth trend, and the Japanese economy has experienced a massive loss in GDP. The slow post-…nancial crisis recoveries therefore cast doubt on the validity of the argument in the literature starting from Lucas (1987) that welfare costs of business cycles are small enough that they do not justify stabilization policy. 1 Thus our paper addresses the question of whether and to what extent monetary policy is able to ameliorate welfare in the face of a severe recession that is caused by an adverse …nancial disturbance and is followed by a slow recovery. Particularly, in that situation, should monetary policy focus mainly on in ‡ation stabilization and make no response to output, as advocated in the existing monetary policy literature including Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006, 2007a, b) ? 2 This paper develops a model in which an adverse …nancial shock can induce a severe recession and a subsequent slow recovery, and examines how monetary policy should react to the …nancial shock in terms of social welfare. According to the International Monetary Fund (2009), slowdowns in total factor productivity (TFP) were a signi…cant cause of slow recoveries following banking crises around the globe during the past 40 years. 3 Indeed, as a main source of Japan's prolonged stagnation, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) point to a TFP 1 Lucas (1987) argues that U.S. business cycles in the postwar period-of course, prior to 1987-involve at most negligible welfare costs. See also Lucas (2003) . 2 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006, 2007a, b) show that a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule features a muted response to output in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (without …nancial frictions or endogenous TFP mechanisms).
3 IMF (2009) also indicates that long-lasting reductions in the employment rate and the capital-labor ratio contribute to the slow post-crisis recoveries as well.
slowdown in the wake of the collapse of asset price bubbles in the early 1990s. Such slowdowns have also been measured after the recent global …nancial crisis, particularly in Europe. Our paper thus introduces a …nancial friction and an endogenous TFP mechanism in an otherwise canonical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. 4 TFP grows endogenously by expanding the variety of goods through technology innovation and adoption as in Comin and Gertler (2006) , who extend the framework of endogenous technological change developed by Romer (1990) . The …nancial friction constrains …rms'borrowing capacity as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Then, an adverse shock to the borrowing capacity-which is referred to as an adverse "…nancial shock"following Jermann and Quadrini-induces a slow recovery through the endogenous TFP mechanism. Speci…cally, the adverse …nancial shock tightens …rms'…nancing and thereby reduces their activity, which in turn has a signi…cant negative impact on the economy as a whole by decreasing activity not only on the demand side but also on the supply side of the economy. In particular, the e¤ect on the supply side induces a permanent decline in output relative to a balanced growth path through a permanent decline in TFP. The possibility of such permanent declines in output and other real variables distinguishes our model from those used in the existing literature on monetary policy. This distinctive feature yields a novel implication for monetary policy in terms of welfare costs of business cycles.
This paper analyzes a class of simple monetary policy rules that adjust the current policy rate in response to the contemporaneous rates of in ‡ation and output growth and the past policy rates. The paper shows that in the face of the …nancial shocks, a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule features a strong response to output. This …nding contrasts starkly with Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006, 2007a, b) . This contrast arises for two reasons. First, TFP is driven through the endogenous mechanism in our paper, whereas it is exogenous in 4 Queraltó (2013) builds a small open-economy real business cycle (RBC) model with the Gertler and Karadi (2011) …nancial friction and the Comin and Gertler (2006) endogenous TFP mechanism to describe slow post-crisis recoveries observed in emerging market economies. Guerron-Quintana and Jinnai (2014) use U.S. time series, including their measured intangible capital, to estimate (mainly shocks in) an RBC model with the Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) …nancial friction and the Kung and Schmid (2015) endogenous technological change. They show that around the time of Lehman Brothers' demise, liquidity declined signi…cantly, inducing the U.S. Great Recession. their papers. Second, the type of shocks considered in deriving a welfare-maximizing rule di¤ers. Our paper focuses only on the …nancial shock, while their papers consider mainly a TFP shock.
The paper also demonstrates that the welfare gain from output stabilization is much more substantial than in the model where TFP is exogenously given. In the presence of the endogenous TFP mechanism, it is crucial to take into account a welfare loss from a permanent decline in consumption caused by a slowdown in TFP. 5 Moreover, compared with the welfare-maximizing rule, a strict in ‡ation or price-level targeting rule induces a sizable welfare loss, because it has no response to output. By contrast, a nominal GDP growth or level targeting rule performs well, although it causes relatively high interest-rate volatility.
In addition to the welfare analysis of monetary policy in our model, the paper conducts a …nancial crisis scenario simulation under the policy rules examined above. In this simulation, a slowdown in TFP is much less pronounced under the welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule than under the strict price-level targeting rule. Consequently, output recovers to its pre-crisis growth trend faster under the welfare-maximizing rule, implying that the welfare gain from adopting this rule relative to the strict price-level targeting rule is sizable, as noted above. Under the nominal GDP level targeting rule, the achieved levels of TFP and output are almost the same as those under the welfare-maximizing rule, implying that the welfare gain from adopting the latter rule relative to the former is small, as indicated above.
Yet a smaller decline in …rms'loans than that in the value of their collateral tightens their borrowing constraint and raises the marginal cost of funds and hence in ‡ation. Under the nominal GDP level targeting rule, this rise in in ‡ation induces an initial increase in the interest rate even in the …nancial crisis scenario, and then the interest rate is lowered to hit zero, causing relatively high interest-rate volatility, as noted above.
A closely related and complementary study has been done by Reifschneider, Wascher, 5 Similarly, Barlevy (2004) argues that business cycle ‡uctuations can a¤ect welfare by in ‡uencing the growth rate of consumption, in contrast to Lucas (1987 Lucas ( , 2003 .
and Wilcox (2013). These authors conduct optimal-control exercises using a version of the FRB/US model with an ad hoc loss function that re ‡ects the Federal Reserve's dual mandate.
They argue plausibly that a signi…cant portion of the recent damage to the supply side of the U.S. economy is endogenous to the weakness in aggregate demand, 6 and such endogeneity provides a strong motivation for a vigorous policy response to a weakening in aggregate demand. Our paper has demonstrated a similar argument to theirs, but has examined a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule using a fully ‡edged DSGE model augmented with The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y reviews recent post…nancial crisis recoveries. Section 3 presents a DSGE model with a …nancial friction and an endogenous TFP mechanism. Section 4 con…rms that in this model an adverse …nancial shock can induce a severe recession and a subsequent slow recovery. Section 5 conducts monetary policy analysis using the model. Section 6 concludes.
A Brief Review of Post-Financial Crisis Recoveries
This section brie ‡y reviews the economic developments around recent …nancial crises to show key features of post-…nancial crisis recoveries. 7 The crises focused on here are the 2007-08 crises in the Euro area, the U.K., and the U.S. and the 1997 crisis in Japan. 8 For these …nancial crises, Fig. 1 plots the developments of four key variables: real GDP per capita, TFP (Solow residual), bank lending, and the CPI in ‡ation rate. Note that in each panel of the …gure, the scale of years at the top is for Japan only, while that at the bottom is for the other three economies. In Panels (a) and (b), the pre-crisis trend is given by an average over the four economies during the …ve years up to each crisis. In each panel, 6 Summers (2014) argues-in contrast to Say's law-that "Lack of Demand creates Lack of Supply." 7 For comprehensive studies on post-…nancial crisis recoveries, see, e.g., Cerra and Saxena (2008), Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009), IMF (2009), and Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) . 8 In 1997, Yamaichi Securities-one of the top four securities companies in Japan at that time-failed, and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed, which was the …rst failure of a city bank in Japan's postwar history. (b) TFP (Solow residual) (log, level) Figure 1 : Economic developments around recent …nancial crises.
Notes: In each panel of the …gure, the scale of years at the top is for Japan only, while that at the bottom is for the other three economies. In Panels (a) and (b), the pre-crisis trend is given by an average over the four economies during the …ve years up to each crisis. The data on TFP come from the Conference Board Total Economy Database.
the following key feature of post-…nancial crisis recoveries is detected.
First, and most importantly, the post-…nancial crisis recoveries were quite slow, as shown in Panel (a). Since the onset of the recent crises, GDP in the U.S. has not recovered to the pre-crisis growth trend, and GDP in the Euro area and in the U.K. have not even returned to their pre-crisis levels. Japan's GDP has never recovered to the pre-crisis growth trend since the 1997 crisis, and the Japanese economy has experienced a massive loss in GDP. This This is the second key feature of post-…nancial crisis recoveries.
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The third key feature is that a reduction in the degree of …nancial intermediation was observed during and after the …nancial crises, as shown in Panel (c). Bank lending in the Euro area, the U.K., and the U.S. all dropped sharply in 2009 and then remained stagnant.
Japan's bank lending was already stagnant because of non-performing-loan problems in the wake of the collapse of asset price bubbles in the early 1990s, and it dropped further in 1999.
Last, the in ‡ation rate was less stable after the …nancial crises, as shown in Panel (d).
In the Euro area, the U.K., and the U.S., the in ‡ation rate measured by CPI dropped after the 2007-08 crises and then continued to ‡uctuate. 10 In Japan, the CPI in ‡ation rate was already low after the collapse of asset price bubbles in the early 1990s, and it dropped further after the 1997 crisis, falling into de ‡ation.
9 IMF (2009) also indicates the importance of slowdowns in TFP for slow recoveries that followed banking crises around the globe during the past 40 years. 10 Although the sharp drop in the CPI in ‡ation rate in the Euro area and the U.S. partly re ‡ected a decline in energy prices, the in ‡ation rate measured by CPI excluding energy decreased as well.
Based on these features of post-…nancial crisis recoveries, the next section develops a model in which an adverse …nancial shock can induce a severe recession and a subsequent slow recovery.
A DSGE Model of Slow Post-Financial Crisis Recoveries
To describe a slow post-…nancial crisis recovery like those reported in the preceding section, our paper introduces a …nancial friction and an endogenous TFP mechanism in an otherwise canonical DSGE model. In the model economy, there are …nal-good …rms, intermediate-good …rms, retailers, wholesalers, technology adopters, technology innovators, households, employment agencies, and a central bank. 12 The behavior of these agents is described in what follows.
Final-good …rms
There is a continuum of …nal-good …rms f 2 [0; A t 1 ]. Each …rm f produces …nal good X f;t by combining intermediate goods fX f;t (h)g h2[0;1] according to the CES production func-
with the elasticity of substitution x > 1. The …rm sells the …nal good to wholesalers under perfect competition so as to maximize pro…t 
Substituting this demand curve in the production function leads to the price equation for
Intermediate-good …rms
Intermediate-good …rms play a central role in the model. They engage in various types of activity: borrowing, hiring, capital investment, purchase of newly adopted ideas, production, price setting, and dividend payment.
There is a continuum of intermediate-good …rms h 2 [0; 1]. Each …rm h owns capital K t 1 (h) and a continuum of adopted ideas (e.g., patents) f 2 [0; A t 1 (h)], and adjusts the capital utilization rate u t (h). For each adopted idea f , the …rm uses e¤ective capital u t (h)K f;t 1 (h) and labor n f;t (h) to produce intermediate good X f;t (h) according to the Cobb-Douglas production function X f;t (h) = (n f;t (h)) 1 (u t (h)K f;t 1 (h)) with the capital elasticity of output 2 (0; 1). The symmetry among adopted ideas f implies an identical e¤ective capital-labor ratio in …rm h's production for each intermediate good X f;t (h),
. Then, aggregating …rm h's production functions-along with …nal-good 12 Wholesalers, retailers, and employment agencies are added to the model, only for introducing price and wage rigidities.
…rms'demand curves (1)-yields
where
Each …rm h accumulates capital K t (h) and adopted ideas A t (h) according to
where is the price of retail goods. It is assumed that the …rm must pay for labor n t (h), capital investment I t (h), and newly adopted ideas a;t (h) before its production takes place. To …nance this payment, the …rm raises funds with an intratemporal loan
where W t is the real wage and V t is the real value of an adopted idea. 13 The intratemporal loan is repaid with no interest at the end of the period. The capacity of the intratemporal loan 13 Jermann and Quadrini (2012) suppose that …rms use an intratemporal loan to …nance total payment made in the period, including payments for dividends and intertemporal debt. We choose our speci…cation of the intratemporal loan because the assumption that …rms prepay for production factors seems reasonable. P t L t (h) and intertemporal debt P t B t (h) is constrained by the value of capital and adopted ideas held by the …rm because of a lack of enforcement. In particular, the …rm can default on its debt (both P t L t (h) and P t B t (h)) before the payment for the intratemporal loan is made at the end of the period. In case of default, the capital and adopted ideas held by the …rm are seized with probability t 2 (0; 1). Then, it follows from the argument of Jermann and Quadrini (2012) that the intratemporal loan P t L t (h) is limited by the borrowing constraint
It is assumed throughout the paper that this borrowing constraint is always binding and that the log-deviation of the foreclosure probability t from its steady-state value follows the stationary …rst-order autoregressive process
where 0 < 1 and where ;t is white noise and is called a "…nancial shock."
After the intratemporal loan arrangement is made, each …rm h produces and sells intermediate goods to …nal-good …rms and then pays back the loan. Moreover, the …rm renews intertemporal debt and pays dividends P t D t (h) to households. Let the sum of the dividends and associated payment costs in terms of retail goods be denoted by ' t (h)A t 1 , where with …nal-good …rms'demand curves (1)-can then be written as
Each …rm h chooses dividends
the utilization rate u t (h), its products'prices fP
, and adopted ideas A t (h) to maximize the expected discounted value of the present and future dividends (2)- (7), where m 0;t is the real stochastic discount factor between period 0 and period t. Because intermediate-good …rms are symmetric, the …rm index h can be deleted from the …rst-order conditions for dividend maximization. Then, substituting the …rst-order condition for dividends in those for capital and intertemporal debt yields
where m t;t+1 = m 0;t+1 =m 0;t , '
are the Lagrange multipliers on the aggregate production function (2) and the borrowing constraint (6), and t = P t =P t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate of retail goods'price. Combining the …rst-order conditions for dividends, labor, and the utilization rate leads to
. Substituting the …rst-order condition for dividends in those for the prices yields
where x = x =( x 1). 14 Moreover, the aggregate production function (2), the budget constraint (7), and the …rst-order condition for adopted ideas can be rewritten as
14 The symmetry among intermediate-good …rms implies an identical price for each intermediate good
In the ampli…cation mechanism generated by the …nancial friction and endogenous TFP, intermediate-good …rms' demand curve for adopted ideas (15) plays an important role.
Through this demand curve, an adverse …nancial shock decreases the value of an adopted idea V t , because it not only lowers the foreclosure probability t but also tightens the borrowing constraint (6) and thus increases the associated Lagrange multiplier t . As shown later, such a decrease in the value of an adopted idea causes technology adopters to become less willing to adopt developed but not yet adopted ideas. The resulting decline in newly adopted ideas has a persistent e¤ect because of their accumulation process (4). Therefore, an adverse …nancial shock induces a permanent decline in output relative to a balanced growth path through the persistent decline in adopted ideas (or equivalently TFP). This mechanism is further strengthened when an adverse …nancial shock is persistent or is expected to continue occurring.
Retailers
There is a representative retailer. It produces retail goods Y t by combining wholesale goods 
Substituting this demand curve in the production function leads to retail goods'price equa-
Wholesalers
There is a continuum of wholesalers h 2 [0; 1]. Each wholesaler h produces its good Y h;t by combining …nal goods fX f;t g f 2[0;A t 1 ] according to the CES production function
with the elasticity of substitution a > 1 so as to minimize cost
. The …rst-order condition for cost minimization yields wholesaler h's demand curve for each …nal good X f;t
where M C h;t is the Lagrange multiplier on wholesaler h's production function and represents its marginal cost. Substituting this demand curve in the production function leads to
. This shows that the marginal cost is identical among wholesalers. Using the price equations (12), the marginal cost can be reduced to
where a = a =( a 1). Then, from this equation and equations (12), (13), and (18), the output of wholesale good Y h;t is given by
Using this equation, two more key equations can be derived. First, substituting equations (12), (19) , and (20) in wholesalers'demand curve (18) leads to X f;t = n 1 t
Combining this equation and intermediate-good …rms'demand curve for adopted ideas (15) yields
Second, aggregating wholesale goods'output equations (20)-along with retailers'demand curves (16)-leads to
represents dispersion of wholesale goods'prices and where
represents the level of technology in the whole economy and its growth rate t = A t =A t 1
shows the gross rate of technological change. Equation (22) presents a standard CobbDouglas production function, except that TFP is endogenously determined by
Under monopolistic competition, each wholesaler h sets its product's price on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) . In each period, a fraction p 2 (0; 1) of wholesalers sets prices according to the indexation rule P h;t = P h;t 1 , where is the steady-state value of the in ‡ation rate t , while the remaining fraction 1 p chooses the priceP h;t that maximizes the associated pro…t
given the marginal cost M C t+f and retailers'demand curve
where M t;t+f is the nominal stochastic discount factor between period t and period t + f .
The …rst-order condition for the optimal staggered priceP h;t yields
where y = y =( y 1) and the auxiliary variables p1;t and p2;t are de…ned recursively by
where the equilibrium condition M t;t+h = ( h C t =C t+h )= t+h -which is derived later-is used, 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, and C t is consumption. Moreover, under the staggered price setting, retail goods'price equation (17) and the price dispersion equation (23) can be reduced respectively to
Technology adopters
There is a continuum of technology adopters. Each adopter owns a developed but not yet adopted idea that is in the interval between A t 1 and Z t 1 . This adopter makes an investment I a;t for technology adoption in terms of retail goods. The adopter successfully adopts the idea with probability t 2 (0; 1). This probability takes the form
with 0 > 0 and ! 2 (0; 1), as in Comin and Gertler (2006) . Thus, the probability t increases with investment I a;t , and there is a spillover e¤ect from already adopted ideas A t 1 to individual adoption. The presence of A t 1 keeps the probability t stationary. Because
, the spillover e¤ect is positive as long as + a < 2, which holds under our parameterization of the model presented later.
After the adoption, a fraction a of adopted ideas becomes obsolete. Thus, the amount of newly adopted ideas sold to intermediate-good …rms is given by
The value of a developed but not yet adopted idea is given by
A developed idea, if successfully adopted, is sold to intermediate-good …rms at the real price V t . Otherwise, the value of the idea is given by its expected discounted value E t [m t;t+1 J t+1 ].
The …rst-order condition for investment I a;t yields
Thus, a decline in the value of an adopted idea V t directly decreases technology adoption investment I a;t , which in turn lowers the probability of technology adoption t and thus further decreases the investment I a;t . This spiral slows the rate of technology adoption and hence the growth rates of A t and TFP. Moreover, substituting equation (34) in equation (33) leads to
which shows that a decline in the value of an adopted idea V t decreases the value of a developed but not yet adopted idea J t .
Technology innovators
There is a representative technology innovator. This innovator transforms one unit of retail goods into t units of developed ideas. Given the obsolescence rate a , the frontier of developed ideas, Z t , follows the law of motion
where I d;t is R&D investment. As in Comin and Gertler (2006) , the R&D productivity t takes the form
with z > 0 and 2 (0; 1). The zero-pro…t condition under perfect competition can be reduced to
Combining this condition and the law of motion of developed ideas (36) yields
Thus, a decline in the expected discounted value of a developed but not yet adopted idea 
Households and employment agencies
Households are standard as in the literature on DSGE models. There is a continuum of households with measure unity, each of which is endowed with one type of specialized labor f 2 [0; 1]. Households have monopolistic power over wages for specialized labor, and the wages are set in a staggered manner. 15 A representative employment agency transforms specialized labor into homogeneous labor and provides the latter to intermediate-good …rms.
The problem of households consists of three parts: a consumption-saving problem, the employment agency's problem, and a wage-setting problem. In the consumption-saving problem, each household chooses consumption C t and savings B t to maximize the utility
subject to the budget constraint
where > 0 is the elasticity of labor supply, n > 0 is the coe¢ cient on labor disutility relative to contemporaneous consumption utility, W f;t and n f;t are the real wage and the supply of specialized labor f , and T f;t is the sum of intermediate-good …rms'dividend payout P t D t , the other …rms'pro…ts, a lump-sum public transfer, and a net ‡ow from contingent claims on the opportunity of wage changes. The presence of the contingent claims allows the model to keep a representative-household framework.
Combining the …rst-order conditions for the consumption-saving problem yields
which leads to M t;t+h = m t;t+h = t+h = (
The retail-good market clearing condition is now given by
The output Y t equals households' consumption C t , intermediate-good …rms' capital investment I t , their dividend payment costs (' t A t 1 D t ), technology adopters'investment I a;t (Z t 1 A t 1 ), and technology innovators'R&D investment I d;t . 15 Nominal wage rigidity is an important factor to describe a slow recovery induced by an adverse …nancial shock in the model, as shown later.
The employment agency transforms specialized labor fn f;t g f 2[0;1] into homogeneous labor n t according to the CES aggregation function n t = (
with the elasticity of substitution n > 1. The agency then chooses the amount of all types of specialized labor fn f;t g f 2[0;1] to maximize pro…t P t W t n t R 1 0 P t W f;t n f;t df , given homogeneous labor's wage P t W t and specialized labor's wages fP t W f;t g f 2[0;1] . The …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization yields the employment agency's demand curve for each type of specialized labor n f;t = n t
Substituting this demand curve in the aggregation function leads to homogeneous labor's wage equation
The wage of each type of specialized labor is set on a staggered basis as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). In each period, a fraction w 2 (0; 1) of wages is set according to the indexation rule P t W f;t = w P t 1 W f;t 1 , where w = is the gross steady-state wage in ‡ation rate and is the steady-state value of the gross rate of technological change t , while the remaining fraction 1 w is set at the wage P tWf;t that maximizes
given the employment agency's demand curve n f;t+hjt = n t+h [
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (41). The …rst-order condition for the optimal staggered wage P tWf;t yields
where n = n =( n 1) and the auxiliary variables w1;t and w2;t are de…ned recursively by
Under the staggered wage setting, homogeneous labor's wage equation (45) can be reduced
The central bank
The central bank follows a Taylor (1993)-type rule that adjusts the current policy rate in response to the past policy rate and the current rates of price in ‡ation and output growth of retail goods log r t = r log r t 1 + (1 r ) log r + (log t log ) + dy log
where r is the steady-state policy rate, r 2 [0; 1) represents the degree of policy rate smoothing, and and dy are the policy responses to in ‡ation and output growth. 16 The equilibrium conditions consist of equations (3)- (6) (without the index h and with the equality holding in (6)), (8)- (11), (14), (19) , (21), (22), (24)- (32), (34)- (38), (42), (43), (46)- (49), and (50). Appendix A presents equilibrium conditions and the steady state in terms of stationary variables.
A Slow Recovery Induced by an Adverse Financial Shock
This section con…rms that the model presented in the preceding section possesses the capability to describe a slow recovery induced by an adverse …nancial shock. To this end, the model is parameterized, linearized around the steady state, and solved for the rational expectations equilibrium. Then, impulse responses show how an adverse …nancial shock generates a slow recovery. Last, two key factors to describe the slow recovery-the endogenous TFP mechanism and nominal wage rigidity-are explained. 16 No output gap is included in the monetary policy rules considered in the paper. This is because in the model, where monetary policy can a¤ect TFP, it is not clear which output gap monetary policymakers ought to stabilize. The gap between actual output and potential output that could be obtained in the absence of nominal rigidities-which has been considered as a theoretically appropriate output gap for monetary policymakers in models where TFP is exogenously given-seems to be inappropriate, because welfare losses arise not only from nominal rigidities but also from the endogenous TFP mechanism. Table 1 lists the parameterization of the quarterly model.
Regarding the parameters in the …rst set, this paper chooses the subjective discount factor at = 0:9975 and the steady-state gross rate of technological change at
implying an annualized steady-state real interest rate of 2 percent. Steady-state labor is normalized to unity, i.e., n = 1. The paper also sets the elasticity of labor supply at = 1, the capital elasticity of output at = 0:36, the steady-state capital utilization rate at u = 1, the steady-state capital depreciation rate at k = 0:025 (i.e., an annualized rate of 10 percent), the steady-state elasticity of capital depreciation at 2 = 1 = 0:5, the degrees of price and wage rigidities at p = w = 0:75, the elasticities of substitution among wholesale goods and among labor at y = n = 11 (i.e., y = n = 1:1), the steady-state gross in ‡ation rate at = 1:005 (i.e., an annualized rate of 2 percent), the degree of policy rate smoothing at r = 0:7, and the policy responses to in ‡ation and output growth at = 1:5 and dy = 0:25.
These parameter values are more or less within the values calibrated or estimated in previous studies with DSGE models.
Next, the values of the parameters that pertain to the technology innovation and adoption are explained. This paper follows Comin and Gertler (2006) to set the elasticities of substitution among intermediate goods and among …nal goods at x = a = 2:67 (i.e., x = a = 1:6), the steady-state probability of technology adoption at = 0:025 (i.e., an average duration of technology adoption of 10 years), the elasticity of the probability of technology adoption at ! = 0:95, and the elasticity of R&D productivity at = 0:8. The steady-state ratio of R&D investment to output is chosen at i d =y = 0:025.
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Last, the values of the parameters that pertain to the …nancial friction are presented. This paper follows Table 2 of Jermann and Quadrini (2012) to set the steady-state probability of foreclosure at = 0:1634, the elasticity of the dividend payment costs at d = 0:146, the tax bene…t at = 0:35, and the …nancial shock persistence at = 0:9703. 17 The values of the obsolescence rate of ideas a and the scaling parameter of R&D productivity z are calculated from steady-state conditions, as shown in Appendix A.2.
Impulse responses to an adverse …nancial shock
Using the model parameterization presented above, this subsection analyzes impulse responses to an adverse …nancial shock. 18 Fig. 2 presents impulse responses of intratemporal loans L t , labor n t , capital investment I t , output Y t , consumption C t , the in ‡ation rate t , the interest rate r t , and TFP T F P t to the adverse …nancial shock ;1 = 0:01. This …gure expresses labor in terms of percentage deviations from its steady-state value and the rates of in ‡ation and interest in terms of percentage di¤erences from their steady-state values, while the others are expressed in terms of percentage deviations from their steady-state growth paths starting from period 0. The solid line, called the "benchmark,"represents the case of the model presented in the preceding section. When the adverse …nancial shock ;1 hits the economy in period 1, it lowers the foreclosure probability t and tightens the borrowing constraint (6), so that intratemporal loans to intermediate-good …rms, L t , drop. The …rms then reduce labor n t , capital investment I t , and purchase of newly adopted ideas a;t . This in turn has a negative impact on the economy as a whole. The declines in labor and capital investment decrease output Y t and consumption C t , as well as in ‡ation t , inducing a recession. 19 In reaction to the declines in in ‡ation and output growth, the monetary policy rule (50) lowers the interest rate r t .
On the other hand, the decline in the purchase of newly adopted ideas lowers technology adoption and innovation, so that TFP falls permanently relative to its steady-state growth path through the endogenous mechanism embedded in the model. As noted above, an adverse …nancial shock decreases the value of an adopted idea V t through intermediate-good 18 Regarding impulse responses to a monetary policy shock (i.e., a shock added to the monetary policy rule (50)), we con…rm that the model possesses standard properties for monetary policy analysis. That is, in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, the interest rate rises, and then output, labor, consumption, and investment all decline. In ‡ation decreases as well. Overall, these impulse responses are consistent with those in canonical DSGE models. 19 In response to the adverse …nancial shock, in ‡ation declines because of a decrease in wholesalers' real marginal cost M C t =P t . Equation (19) shows that M C t =P t = x (S t =A a 1 t 1 )' …rms' demand curve for adopted ideas (21) . This decline in the value of an adopted idea reduces technology adopters'investment I a;t through equation (34) and lowers the adoption probability t through equation (31) , thereby slowing the growth rates of A t and TFP.
Moreover, because the adverse …nancial shock is persistent, it lowers the expected discounted value of an adopted idea, E t m t;t+1 V t+1 , and decreases the expected discounted value of a developed but not yet adopted idea, E t m t;t+1 J t+1 , through equation (35). This decrease in the latter expected discounted value reduces R&D investment I d;t through equation (39) and slows the growth rate of Z t , which constrains TFP growth and causes TFP to fall permanently (relative to the steady-state growth path). As a consequence of this mechanism, neither output, consumption, nor capital investment returns to the steady-state balanced growth path after the adverse …nancial shock hits the economy. Indeed, output drops below the steady-state balanced growth path by about 0:9 percentage point and then recovers by less than half of the drop, remaining below the path by about 0:6 percentage point even after 40 quarters (10 years). From these observations, we con…rm that the model possesses the capability to describe a slow recovery induced by an adverse …nancial shock.
Key factors for a slow recovery induced by an adverse …nancial shock
Before proceeding to monetary policy analysis, this subsection investigates which factor in the model is important for describing a slow recovery induced by an adverse …nancial shock.
In Fig. 2 This drop in labor reduces output Y t directly through the aggregate production function (22) .
Moreover, in the presence of nominal wage rigidity, the level of labor continues to be lower than in the absence of the rigidity, which decreases the value of an adopted idea V t through intermediate-good …rms'demand curve for adopted ideas (21) . This decline in the value of an adopted idea slows the growth rates of A t and TFP, as indicated above. Consequently, the permanent decline in output is larger in the benchmark model. Therefore, nominal wage rigidity is another key factor for describing the slow recovery induced by the …nancial shock.
Monetary Policy Analysis
This section examines how monetary policy should react to the …nancial shocks. To this end, the section begins by deriving a welfare measure from the utility functions of households.
With this welfare measure, a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule is computed and characterized. Last, under the welfare-maximizing rule and other rules, a …nancial crisis scenario simulation is carried out.
Welfare measure
The welfare measure is the unconditional expectation of the average utility function over households, given by
where E is the unconditional expectation operator and the scaling factor (1 ) is multiplied for normalization. Because TFP grows endogenously over time, a deterministic trend with the steady-state rate of technological change is subtracted from this welfare measure SW for the ease of computation. Letting SW denote the resulting stationary welfare measure, Appendix B shows that this welfare measure can be approximated around the steady state, up to the second order, as
where V ar denotes the unconditional variance operator, c t (= C t =A t 1 ) is detrended consumption, c is its steady-state value, " x = E(x t ) x is the "bias"between the unconditional mean and the steady-state value of variable x t , and w;t = R 1 0 (W f;t =W t ) n (1+1= ) df denotes wage dispersion arising from the staggered wage setting of households. Note that in the second-order approximation, the bias can exist; that is, the unconditional mean does not necessarily coincide with the steady-state value. The approximation (52) shows that the stationary welfare measure SW is negatively related to the bias in labor and wage dispersion and the unconditional variances of detrended consumption, the rate of technological change, and labor (i.e., " n , " w , V ar (c t ), V ar ( t ), V ar (n t )) and is positively related to the bias in detrended consumption and the rate of technological change (i.e., " c , " ). A distinctive feature of the welfare measure (52) lies in the presence of the terms related to the rate of technological change t (i.e., " , V ar ( t )). In standard DSGE models where TFP is exogenously given, the bias and the unconditional variance of the rate of technological change are also exogenously given and independent of policy. In our model, however, TFP grows endogenously and depends on policy, so that the t -related terms constitute social welfare relevant to policy evaluation.
Let SW b and SW a denote the values of the welfare measure SW attained under the benchmark monetary policy rule (i.e., the rule (50) with the benchmark parameterization presented in Table 1 ) and under an alternative monetary policy rule, and let SW = 
where fC b;t ; fn b;f;t gg is the pair of equilibrium consumption and labor under the benchmark monetary policy rule, and then it follows
where the last approximation uses the second-order approximation to log(1 + g) around
Using the welfare measure (52) and the welfare gain measure g, the next subsections analyze a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule in reaction to the …nancial shocks.
Features of welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule in reaction to …nancial shocks
This paper considers a class of simple monetary policy rules that adjust the current policy rate in response to the past policy rates and the current rates of in ‡ation and output growth.
Speci…cally, two forms of such rules are analyzed. One form is, of course, the rule (50). The present paper refers to this rule as " ‡exible in ‡ation targeting." Moreover, in this form, the speci…cation of dy = 0 is called "strict in ‡ation targeting," while the speci…cation of = dy is called "nominal GDP growth targeting." The other form is the so-called "…rst-di¤erence rule," where the change in the policy rate responds to its past change and the current rates of in ‡ation and output growth 20 log r t log r t 1 = r (log r t 1 log r t 2 )+(1 r ) (log t log ) + dy log
This rule is referred to as " ‡exible price-level targeting," and in this form, the speci…cation of dy = 0 is called "strict price-level targeting" and the speci…cation of = dy is called "nominal GDP level targeting." 21 These labels are because these speci…cations are implied respectively by such targeting rules. 22 In each speci…cation of the monetary policy rules, three requirements are imposed on the coe¢ cients, following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007b). First, the coe¢ cients guarantee local determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium. Second, they satisfy 1 10, 0 dy 10, and 0 r < 1. Last, they meet the condition on the volatility of the policy rate, 2(V ar(r t )) 0:5 < r 1. Then, a combination of the coe¢ cients that ful…lls these three requirements and maximizes the welfare measure (52) is computed using the second-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions of the model around the steady state. 20 For …rst-di¤erence rules, see, e.g., Orphanides (2003) . 21 For recent discussions on nominal GDP level targeting, see, for example, Woodford (2012) and English, López-Salido, and Tetlow (2013). 22 One point to be emphasized here is that our speci…cations of the price-level targeting rules and the nominal GDP level targeting rule are more implementable than the "original" speci…cations in which the current policy rate is adjusted in response to the past policy rate and the current deviations of the price level and the GDP level from their target paths, because the original speci…cations grant leeway in the choice of the target paths. For each speci…cation of the monetary policy rules, the welfare gain g denotes the one from adopting this rule relative to the benchmark rule (i.e., the ‡exible in ‡ation-targeting rule (50) with = 1:5, dy = 0:25, and r = 0:7) in terms of a permanent increase in consumption, and the term " -bias" shows the fraction in the total welfare gain of the welfare gain arising from an improvement in the bias of the rate of technological change t .
In deriving a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule, this paper focuses on the …nancial shock only. That is, such a rule is derived under the condition that only the …nancial shocks occur in the economy. This exclusive focus allows us to characterize the welfare-maximizing rule from the perspective of the …nancial shock, which not only constitutes one of the most important driving forces in U.S. business cycles, as argued by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), but also causes a slow recovery in our model, as shown in the preceding section. Therefore, the …nancial shock is worth analyzing independently from other shocks. In computing the welfare-maximizing rule, the standard deviation of the …nancial shock is set at 0:98 percent as in Table 2 of Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
For each speci…cation of the monetary policy rules, Table 2 shows a welfare-maximizing combination of its coe¢ cients in reaction to the …nancial shocks. In this table, three …ndings are detected. First of all, a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule features a strong response to output. Within the rule speci…cations and coe¢ cient requirements, the welfare-maximizing rule is the ‡exible in ‡ation-targeting rule (50) with = 1, dy = 10, and r = 0:98. In this rule, the policy response to output hits its upper bound, while the one to in ‡ation hits its lower bound. Even if the policy response to wage in ‡ation, 
23
The …nding that the welfare-maximizing rule calls for a strong response to output contrasts starkly with Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006, 2007a, b) , who argue that a welfaremaximizing monetary policy rule features a muted response to output. This contrast arises from two factors. First, our model features the endogenous TFP mechanism, whereas theirs do not. Indeed, if such a mechanism is abstracted from our model, the welfare-maximizing rule responds less aggressively to output and more strongly to in ‡ation than that of our model, as reported in the last row of Table 2 . Second, the type of shocks considered in deriving a welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule is di¤erent. Our paper focuses only on the …nancial shock, while their papers consider mainly a TFP shock. Indeed, when the …nan-cial shock is replaced with an exogenous TFP shock that follows the stationary …rst-order autoregressive process with the persistence parameter of 0:9457 and the innovation standard deviation of 0:45 percent as in Table 2 of Jermann and Quadrini (2012), the ‡exible in ‡ation-targeting rule (50) contains its welfare-maximizing coe¢ cients = 10, dy = 5:86, and r = 0:86, so that the rule shows a stronger response to in ‡ation than to output. 24 The second …nding we can see in the table is that the welfare gain from output stabi- 23 As emphasized in the preceding section, nominal wage rigidity is a crucially important factor for describing a slow recovery induced by an adverse …nancial shock. In the absence of this rigidity, the magnitude of a permanent decline in output in response to an adverse …nancial shock is much smaller than in the presence of the rigidity. As a consequence, if the rigidity is abstracted from our model as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007b), the ‡exible in ‡ation-targeting rule (50) has its welfare-maximizing coe¢ cients The three results presented above are robust with respect to values of parameters that pertain to the technology innovation and adoption and the …nancial friction. 27 
Financial crisis scenario simulations
Under the welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule and other rules analyzed above, this subsection conducts simulations in an illustrative …nancial crisis scenario.
In the scenario, the economy is hit by an adverse …nancial shock of ;t = 0:04 for three periods (t = 1; 2; 3), and this is anticipated by all economic agents in the model when the …rst shock emerges in period 1. A …nancial shock of a similar size occurred in the U.S. during the Great Recession, as can be seen in the estimate of the …nancial shock by Jermann and Quadrini (2012). 28 The anticipated …nancial shocks subsequent to the emergence of the …rst shock seem to be reasonable, because once a …nancial crisis occurs, the resulting …nancial 27 We con…rmed that the results also hold particularly for ! = 0:9, which is the calibrated value in Comin, Gertler, and Santacreu (2014); for = 0:6 and 0:99, which are respectively the lower bound and nearly the upper bound reported in Comin and Gertler (2006) Table 2 . The …gure provides us with three …ndings.
First, in response to the severe …nancial shocks, intratemporal loans drop sharply under the benchmark rule, whereas the decline in the loans is subdued under the welfare-maximizing rule. Hence, slowdowns in total investment growth and TFP growth are much less pronounced under the welfare-maximizing rule than under the benchmark rule. Consequently, output approaches the pre-crisis balanced growth path under the welfare-maximizing rule, while it does not under the benchmark rule, implying that the welfare gain from adopting the former rule relative to the latter is huge, as shown in the preceding subsection. The in ‡ation rate then drops under the benchmark rule, whereas it rises under the welfare-maximizing rule. This rise is because the decline in intratemporal loans of intermediate-good …rms is smaller than that in the value of their collateral (i.e., net assets held by the …rms), which tightens the borrowing constraint (6) and increases the associated Lagrange multiplier t (i.e., real marginal cost of funds), thereby raising wholesalers'real marginal cost and hence in ‡ation. According to these developments of in ‡ation and output growth, the benchmark rule lowers the interest rate below zero, while the interest rate cut is subdued and the rate does not hit zero under the welfare-maximizing rule, which contains a weak policy response to in ‡ation, i.e., (1 r ) = 0:02.
Second, under the nominal GDP level targeting rule, the achieved levels of output and total investment are almost the same as those under the welfare-maximizing rule, implying that the welfare gain from adopting the welfare-maximizing rule relative to the nominal GDP Table 2 , where the welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule is the ‡exible in ‡ation targeting one in the benchmark model. level targeting rule is small, as shown in the preceding subsection. The in ‡ation rate then rises for the same reason as that under the welfare-maximizing rule mentioned above. This rise in in ‡ation induces an initial increase in the interest rate under the nominal GDP level targeting rule-which contains a relatively strong response to in ‡ation, i.e., (1 r ) = 0:32-even in the …nancial crisis scenario, and then the interest rate is lowered to hit zero, causing relatively high interest-rate volatility, as noted in the preceding subsection.
Last, under the strict price-level targeting rule, its strong policy response to in ‡ation (i.e., (1 r ) = 10) stabilizes in ‡ation much more than under the welfare-maximizing rule, which contains a weak response to in ‡ation (i.e., (1 r ) = 0:02). Yet the strict price-level targeting rule cannot directly mitigate a slowdown in TFP growth caused by the severe …nancial shocks, because it has no response to output. Consequently, output and total investment recover to the pre-crisis balanced growth path more slowly than under the welfare-maximizing rule, implying that the welfare loss from the strict price-level targeting rule relative to the welfare-maximizing rule is sizable, as shown in the preceding subsection.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a model in which an adverse …nancial shock can induce a slow recovery such as recoveries observed in many economies after the recent global …nancial crisis. 
A.1 Equilibrium conditions
With 33 stationary variables y t = Y t =A t 1 , c t = C t =A t 1 , i t = I t =A t 1 , k t = K t =A t 1 , T F P t = T F P t =T F P t 1 , t , t , p;t , p1;t , p2;t , w1;t , w2;t , u t , n t , r t , t , r t , ' t , ' 0 t , k;t , and 0 k;t , the system of equilibrium conditions consists of the following 33 equations. 
When a (stationary) TFP shock is introduced in the model, it will appear in the equilibrium conditions (A4), (A10), (A12), (A13), (A15), and (A16).
A.2 The steady state
The strategy for computing the steady state is to set target values for labor n, the rate of technological change , the technology adoption rate , and the R&D investment-output ratio i d =y and to pin down the values of the parameters n , z , 0 , and a instead.
In the steady state, labor is normalized to unity, i.e., n = 1. The capital utilization rate is unity, i.e., u = 1. Equilibrium conditions (A2)-(A5), and (A28) yield Besides, (A1) generates
Solving (A24) and (A25) for j and i a leads to
Equilibrium conditions (A22) and (A23) yield B The second-order approximation to the welfare of households
This appendix derives a second-order approximation around the steady state to the unconditional expectation of the average utility function over households, given by (51). Substituting the demand curve for each type of specialized labor, (44), in equation (51) 
and its steady-state value is w = 1. Using c t = C t =A t 1 , the welfare measure SW can be rewritten as 
Because log (A t ) follows, by de…nition, the process log (A t ) = log A t 1 + log ( t ), subtracting (1 ) P 1 t=0 t log A t 1 , where A t is the deterministic trend governed by A 1 = A 1 ,
A t = A t 1 , from both sides of (B2) makes the resulting welfare measure SW stationary, given by
t log(c t ) + log A t 1 A t 1 n 1 + 1= n 
We now approximate the stationary welfare measure SW around the steady state up to the second order. The term related to detrended consumption c t in (B3) is approximated around the steady state as 
where " c = E(c t ) c denotes the bias associated with detrended consumption c t and is of the second order. The term related to A t 1 = A t 1 in (B3) is approximated as
